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Abstract: 
This article examines dynamics underlying the growth of a flourishing bioscience cluster in San Diego, 
California, to illustrate the construction of an innovative environment and the matching of place characteristics 
with a specific economic activity. Extensive interviews explore the formation of synergistic connections 
promoting the political, economic, and social networks of entrepreneurial individuals at the metropolitan scale. 
Spatial proximity is shaped by real estate considerations within and between local clusters in a volatile industry 
affected strongly by shifting access to financial and human capital. Five key factors underlying regional success 
are found to be access to an outstanding research university, advocacy leadership, risk financing, an 
entrepreneurial culture, and appropriate real estate, knit by an intensive information exchange network. 
 
Article: 
The clustering of innovative business sectors in particular metropolitan areas continues to generate interest 
among academics searching for underlying explanations and planners seeking to bring success to their cities. 
Numerous studies speculate on reasons for the rise of these ―technopoles‖ in particular places (Castells & Hall, 
1994; Scott, 1990; Scott & Storper,1992), while calling for further study of their developmental dynamics 
(Cooke, Uranga, & Etxebarria, 1998; Scott, 1990). In response, the following consideration of San Diego‘s 
success in growing a bioscience-oriented life science cluster underlines the importance of human and structural 
factors, integrating individual-oriented network theory with region-based milieu explanations. 
 
As commonly used in the industry, ―life science‖ firms by Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 
include those focusing on biotechnology (SIC 2833-6, using genes to make products), pharmaceuticals (SIC 
2830, including manufacturing, sales, and distribution), surgical and medical devices (SIC 3841, mechanical 
assistance), associated research and development (SIC 8730, research and development), and testing specialties 
(e.g., SIC 8071, research centers, labs). The term bioscience used in this research emphasizes the 
biopharmaceutical and medical device components of the life science cluster in San Diego (see Table 1). Two 
major bioagriculture firms arrived in 1999, but they are an exception in the disease-oriented mix of companies 
(CONNECT, personal communication, 1997). 
 
Special needs of a bioscience cluster, as a type of research-dependent innovative industry, are highlighted. Five 
factors are crucial for the development of a bioscience cluster: an outstanding research university with a 
relevant specialty, a local entrepreneurial culture, strong advocacy leadership, available risk financing, and 
appropriate real estate. The first factor reflects the bioscience industry‘s need to remain tightly tied to a research 
university due to the competitive nature of being first to commercialize a discovery by bringing it to market as a 
trademarked product. Good science is not necessarily good business. Effective technology-transfer 
arrangements require balancing the university‘s desire to capture the resources arising from the research of its 
faculty against the high income and patent revenues that private industry would offer that same faculty involved 
in commercial areas of applied research (Powell & Owen, 1998). San Diego pioneered effective technology-
transfer arrangements in bioscience. 
 
The second indispensable and embedded attribute lies in a local culture supportive of experimentation, failure, 
and recovery. Every drug attaining final Federal Drug Administration (FDA) approval reflects the testing of 
5,000 to 10,000 compounds. This enormous investment of time and money over a lengthy process threatens the 
life span of small, innovative companies (Morrison & Giovannetti, 2000). Entrepreneurship is more likely to 
occur if the local culture supports such risk-taking and provides features decreasing some of the risks, such as 
the next item: advocacy. Leadership actively promoting industry needs and networking constitutes the third 
crucial component. Beyond structural milieu considerations, the human element of leadership imparts a critical 
competitive edge to dynamic locations. 
 
Risk financing, the fourth element, must be sufficient to carry a company through the long time needed to 
develop a product from an idea through testing stages to market acceptance. Venture capitalists are much more 
willing to loan to companies they can easily visit or to individual entrepreneurs they already know. Regions 
such as California and Massachusetts, where a prior high-technology industry prospered (primarily computers), 
are disproportionately endowed with such financiers (Prevezer, 1998). Liberal local financial institutions or 
well-received stock offerings (referred to as initial public offerings, or IPOs) are required for long-term 
survival. 
 
The final factor consists of a supply of real estate available for the three corporate growth stages of start-up, 
initial self-supporting quarters, and full-fledged operations. Bioscience work involves ―messy‖ media, such as 
blood and tissues, so companies need specially configured laboratories that are less interchangeable than 
general office space or even ―cleaner‖ high-tech companies dealing principally with wires and computers. 
Developers must be willing to build such facilities on a speculative basis, given the high failure rate of fledgling 
enterprises. They are more willing to do so if a critical mass of such companies creates a steady demand for 
these units. 
 
The second section of this study outlines innovative milieu and network theory, focusing on the role of regional 
attributes as a geographic attraction factor for nurturing high technology-intensive businesses. San Diego 
presents an intriguing case study of an unlikely innovative milieu due to both its location outside the usual high-
tech regions of San Francisco and Boston and its proximity to much larger metro area rivals slightly to the 
north. San Diego shares its mid-size rank with many other cities dreaming of benefiting from such a dynamic 
industry cluster (Blakely & Nishikawa, 1992; Markusen, Lee, & DiGiovanna, 1999; Walcott, 1999). 
 
The third section applies this model to the California case study by examining how San Diego became 
Bioscience Beach. The rise and demise of local hero Hybritech (the first bioscience firm to generate substantial 
profits for those involved) and its associated corporate progeny are chronicled, along with lessons learned. The 
crucial role key individuals played in transforming San Diego from another Sun Belt site to a ―Bioscience Best 
Practice‖ model is detailed based on a series of targeted interviews. These first three elements are analyzed as 
subsections in the third part. The fourth section analyzes locations of bioscience clusters within the San Diego 
metropolitan region, offering examples for the fourth and fifth factors of financial and physical capital. The 
conclusion highlights examples of the proposed five elements, emphasizing the importance of linked support 
and advocacy networks within a consciously constructed network. These connections resuscitated a region from 
one dependent on a downsizing economic base to one profiting from a laboratory-led growth engine. 
BUILDING AN INNOVATIVE MILIEU ON A BIOSCIENCE BASE: THEORETICAL AND 
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
Particular industries cluster in particular places (Krugman,1991; Porter, 1990). The benefits of proximity are 
apparent on a geographically local scale (Cooke et al., 1998; Malecki, 1991, 1997; Simmie, 1998). Key 
characteristics of innovative milieus include a local atmosphere supporting innovation from discovery through 
production, entrepreneurs, close interaction among firms, and externalities such as expanding capital and labor 
markets (Camagni, 1995; Haug & Ness, 1993). This study of San Diego‘s bioscience base extends current 
theory on the workings of these clusters (Aydalot & Keeble, 1988; P. Hall, 1990; Malmberg, 1997; Malmberg, 
Solvell, & Zander, 1996). 
 
In particular, controversy based on a variety of surveys and interviews in different places concerns the 
appropriate prioritizing of factors critical to a successful innovative milieu. Saxenian (1994) argues that the key 
distinguishing characteristic is the ease and frequency of communication. Contrasting case studies of regions 
possessing high-tech company clusters reveal the impact of different local cultural attitudes, such as Salt Lake 
City, Utah‘s entrepreneurial Mormonism and entities in the Raleigh-Durham area of North Carolina enticed by 
university research that drew labor and other companies (Goldstein & Luger, 1993). Others hold that 
competition between firms, rather than the local culture, promotes knowledge spillovers (Porter, 1990). Some 
studies claimed that a concentration of similar companies is sufficient to induce useful interaction (Glaeser, 
Kallal, Scheinkman, & Shleifer,1992; Griliches,1992). Goetz and Morgan (1995) used statistical tests to 
determine that the amount of research and development (R&D) spending and the number of scientists in the 
specific sector most strongly influenced bioscience firm location. San Diego‘s example tests the notion that 
network-promoting structures, as well as individuals, are required for innovative activity (Audretsch, 1998; 
Saxenian, 1994). 
 
The power of individuals to effect change clarifies the role of various agglomeration theories, from transaction 
cost to flexible specialization. Generating scientific discoveries and corporations depends on particular people. 
The location of these individuals is integral to explaining why a city such as San Diego successfully produced a 
cluster, whereas equally ambitious neighbors such as Orange County and Los Angeles have not. Regional 
attributes alone overlook the networks individuals construct through their associations with institutions or by 
virtue of personal leadership (Barnes, 1989; Sternberg, 1996). The energetic entrepreneur spans and connects 
the laboratory and business worlds (Kenney, 1986). The success of the University of California at San Diego 
(UCSD) in spawning and sustaining a biotech cluster provides an important case study for understanding how 
innovation occurs in particular locations. 
 
Sources of information used in this research include interviews, trade publications, and studies and surveys 
done by local government and industry groups, as well as commercial and government data. The most insightful 
information was obtained through 31 interviews, largely conducted during two visits to the San Diego area, as 
well as through several extended telephone conversations. Interviews provide unique and indispensable value 
by supplementing available numeric data (Cresswell, 1998; Schoenberger, 1991). 
 
Companies were selected for interviews based on the proportion of firms in the same field in that location and 
by prior recommendation. Half of the interviews (15) were conducted in Torrey Pines, the most expensive and 
desirable area bordering the UCSD campus. Of those interviewed, 14 were from biopharmaceutical companies, 
4 were medical device manufacturers, 5 were affiliated with a research institute, and 8 were economic 
developers. The spread of interviewees reflects different locations, sectors, and perspectives. An initial list of 
subjects was selected based on recommendations by CONNECT, UCSD‘s ―Program in Technology and 
Entrepreneurship‖ and the major local organization promoting high technology companies. Subsequent 
interviews provided a more representative coverage of life science industry components. 
 
HOW SAN DIEGO BECAME BIOSCIENCE BEACH: INSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN NETWORKS 
In an industry with many more but less easily tracked private firms, major clusters of public biotechnology 
companies occur in the San Francisco Bay area, New England (primarily Boston), San Diego, New Jersey, and 
Los Angeles-Orange County (see Figure 1). San Diego is the least examined area, with the smallest population 
but a proportionately well-funded industry base (see Figure 2). With the exception of the year 2000, San Diego 
kept pace with its much larger municipal neighbor to the north, competing with Los Angeles–Orange County 
for funds, companies, and technical labor. One city‘s strength is the other city‘s weakness, from commute times 
to airport connections and environmental cleanliness. In 1997, San Diego outpaced San Francisco in per capita 
National Institutes of Health grant dollars, at 10 times the national average (California Healthcare Institute & 
KPMG, 1998). By 2001, San Diego ranked first in attracting biopharmaceutical venture capital (41%) and fifth 
in total national venture capital (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2001). Involvement of foreign pharmaceutical 
companies is difficult to trace due to lack of U.S. government reporting requirements (Welles,1990). Anecdotal 
evidence indicates deals with but not domination by Japanese and European pharmaceutical concerns on 
specific product development cases. The major sector of employment expansion in San Diego‘s life science 
cluster is in biopharmaceutical companies. Bioscience is the second fastest-growing cluster in the San Diego 
region, with an employment increase of 97% from 1990 to 1996. It commands the third-highest employment 
(23,000), topping the chart if medical services are included. San Diego‘s bioscience industry maintained a 
steady core of companies and employees from 1994 to 1997 (San Diego Association of Governments, 1997). 
 
The University Connection 
The story of Hybritech, the most prolific biotech company in San Diego, illustrates some of the challenges to 
getting established, major pitfalls, and potential dynamism of both the life science industry and the region 
(Bowie, 1994; CONNECT, personal communication, April 23, 1998; personal communications, April 1998, 
October 1998). By 1976, pharmaceutical giant Eli Lilly and Company was deeply concerned with the 
decreasing ability of the pig pancreas supply to meet a growing demand for insulin, its major product. Lilly‘s 
research investments spurred a race between rival labs at Harvard and the University of California at San 
Francisco (UCSF) to create insulin. The outcome was the first commercial application of bioscience in the 
health industry, birthing biotech firms Genentech at UCSF in 1976, Hybritech at UCSD in 1977, and Biogen at 
Harvard in 1978. Each company was affiliated with a key scientist and university (S. Hall, 1987; Prevezer, 
1998). The West Coast‘s prominence in bioscience sprang from factors associated with its earlier computer 
industry roots: a risk-supportive environment, venture capital networks, mobile trained labor, and a regional 
culture of open communication. 
 
Hybritech began as a technology transfer from UCSD, illustrating the importance of the first hypothesized 
factor for a bioscience base. Firm cofounders Tim Wollaenger and Ted Green knew each other from previous 
employment with Chicago‘s Baxter Travenol Pharmaceutical. They met again in the course of a routine sales 
call. Green had an idea he was discussing with various venture capitalists, one of whom knew of a scientist 
named Ivor Royston working on a similar idea at UCSD. The San Diego location of Hybritech, which became 
the basis of that region‘s bioscience cluster, thus flowed from a fortuitous connection of venture capital, 
footloose entrepreneurs, and a researcher with a marketable breakthrough idea. Human networks made the 
connection possible. The innovative idea (cloning monoclonal antibodies in large batches to avoid tricky 
calibration and quality-control issues) that became the basis of Hybritech proved to be the most productive 
source of other firms in metro San Diego (see Figure 3). 
 
 
The arrangements under which Royston continued to work at UCSD while developing products for an outside 
corporate entity led the way for a new relationship negotiated with the UC system. Because the company on 
whose board he served as founding scientist gave him a number of grants, the ―Royston Amendments‖ were 
drafted to define the rights of all interested parties, such as the university and corporation, and their obligations 
to publish or patent. The Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act of 1980 permitted 
the passing on of ownership rights for federally funded technology to not-for-profit universities, which then 
engaged in transactions with companies. These transfer arrangements were the critical modus vivendi permitting 
scientists to keep their tenured jobs at universities and work on research while securing outside federal and cor-
porate funds. The annual Association of University Technology Transfer Managers survey demonstrates the 
growth of research funds from all sources and the increasing prominence of corporate largess. The arrangement 
in this case involved a swap for company stock in lieu of royalties for the university, as practiced by the 
Stanford-UC Berkeley Center for Biotechnology Research, which was set up in 1981. Other universities around 
the country followed, evolving from the founding of land grant universities by the Morrill Act in 1862 
(Rosenberg & Nelson, 1994). The center received 30% equity in a promising company in exchange for the 
option to license university patents, using the standard agreement researchers sign when employed by the 
university (California Department of Commerce, 1988; P. Hall, Bornstein, Grier, & Webber, 1988). Such 
arrangements enable ―star scientists‖ to maintain associations with both the university system and local 
businesses. As ―founding scientists‖ or members of corporate scientific advisory boards, their contributions dur-
ing the critical IPO stage were crucial to biotech‘s development and San Diego‘s success (Zucker, Darby, & 
Brewer, 1998). 
 
Local Entrepreneurial Culture 
Hybritech located as close as possible to the UCSD campus so that former university employees and company 
scientists could drive to work in the same direction as their previous jobs without alerting their neighbors that 
they had ―gone corporate‖ (CONNECT and personal communication with company founder, 1998). Salaries 
from corporate success eventually dispelled the taint, as more companies made the leap from the laboratory to 
the business world with commodified innovations. The initial corporate site on Torreyana Street is now part of a 
primarily biotech science park, as is the Roselle Street location of many other early firms on a nearby mesa top. 
 
The convergence between pharmaceuticals and biotechnology promotes collaboration (Mowery & Rosenberg, 
1989). It also opens up new avenues for biotech companies to secure funding to stoke their notoriously high 
cash ―burn rate‖ in pursuit of a marketable product and feeds new innovations into pharmaceutical product 
pipelines (Grabowski & Vernon, 1994). The need for large amounts of start-up funds to carry companies 
through the lengthy years of testing and ultimate FDA sanctioning often leads to the firms‘ acquisition by 
experienced pharmaceutical giants (Pisano, Shan, & Teese, 1988). Hybritech‘s use of recombinant DNA 
technology and their product‘s potential application to colon cancer treatment attracted Eli Lilly and Company. 
Lilly purchased Hybritech in the late 1980s to capitalize on its experimental colon cancer drug. Hybritech‘s 
founders made enormous profits, according to personal interviews, and the price Lilly paid for Hybritech 
attracted attention to biotech‘s possibilities for generating money (Crabtree, 1998; CONNECT and personal 
communication with founder, 1998). Six years and a score of drug development projects later, Lilly decided the 
application it was interested in would not work, so a large diagnostics firm acquired Hybritech. Thus ended a 
classic corporate move to get into a new technology. The number of newly wealthy, creative employees who 
subsequently separated from Hybritech created a core of local venture capitalist ―angels‖ eager to increase their 
profits and stay in an attractive area, both geographically and professionally, by assisting start-ups. The 
notoriously footloose ―bubbles of biotech ... who could go anywhere to work and want exciting places to live‖ 
(personal communication, 1998) found other local enterprises to work in or start up to stay in San Diego. 
 
Innovative milieu elements fall into the realms of personal, corporate, and regional cultures. The large number 
of biotech firms founded in San Diego by Hybritech‘s former employees speaks to the culture clash between 
bureaucratic pharmaceutical companies and experimental, driven biotech entrepreneurs. The ―organization 
man‖ culture of large companies prioritizes compliance to company norms and teamwork above individual 
brilliance (Collins & Moore, 1970). Entrepreneurs need to be free to act on the possibilities of an idea, bringing 
it quickly through the stages of development, test-market, improvement, and final production. The sheer number 
of successful Hybritech spinoffs (see Figure 3), traced in the chart by the university and high-tech business 
organization CONNECT, attests to the strength of the local milieu that sustains innovative companies. 
 
Advocacy Leadership Promoting Networks 
San Diego‘s experience demonstrates the impact of specific individuals on the development of a region through 
propinquity-enhanced networks, highlighting advocacy as the third critical factor in cluster success. San 
Diego‘s outstanding development as a biotechnology center rests in part on its good fortune in attracting 
dynamic, forward-looking individuals who plan and advocate links between university research and companies 
within the industry, and between the industry and outside organizations, whether government agencies, financial 
institutions, or flower shops. One interview subject who worked in San Diego but is now located in another 
region of the country put it succinctly: ―The Number 1 reason for San Diego‘s success is people. Success breeds 
success.‖ He cited Ivor Royston, the scientist-founder of Hybritech, as an example of ―extremely driven 
scientist-entrepreneurs who like to build up companies, then use an ‗exit strategy‘ [sell off to larger company] to 
do it again‖ (personal communication, August 18, 1998). San Diego supports several ―serial entrepreneurs,‖ 
such as Royston, Tim Wollaenger, and Howard Birndorf, illustrated by the proliferating interconnected 
companies in Figure 3. 
 
Interview question categories and responses are outlined in Table 2. As reflected by respondents, UCSD‘s 
prominence in biotechnology-related research areas constitutes the core research institution requirement for 
cluster development, along with the presence of the Scripps Institute of Oceanography and the Salk Institute 
(Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 1987; personal communications). Local military 
facilities, from the Naval Ocean Systems Center to U.S. Marine and Navy bases, supplement a critical labor 
base of engineering and technical talent. Employment at military facilities dropped from a 1990 peak of 44,000 
to 14,600 seven years later (Markoff, 1997). Locally sufficient labor pools—or the ability to attract them—
crucially affect cluster creation (Glaeser,1998). The greatest economic development impact of public sector 
investment in human resource training, physical capital, and research and development comes from place-
concentrated synergies of government, corporate, and university efforts (Malecki, 1985). 
 
Clustering is itself an attraction element, as evidenced by its being ranked as the third most influential among 
interview subjects (see Table 2). The Scripps Institute of Oceanography, the Scripps Research Institute (the 
world‘s largest private biomedical research institute), the Salk Institute (a large, highly respected private 
biological research center), UCSD and area research hospitals such as the Scripps Clinic supply cutting edge 
ideas, innovations, and trained labor (Stutz, 1992). Scripps, Salk, and UCSD professors coordinate lectures and 
advertise them on the Internet, examples of the cross-fertilization prevalent in this cooperative setting. 
Knowledge spillovers come directly from university lectures and laboratories rather than from migrating 
employees bearing company practices, as in other regions (Saxenian, 1994; personal communications, April 22-
24,1998). Companies prioritize clustering close to research centers, expanding to new facilities in the same area, 
and continuing cluster affiliation (San Diego Association of Governments [SANDAG], 1998). 
 
Hopeful economic developers are attracted by the potential link between research at a major university and 
highly profitable companies with well-paid employees generating other companies, jobs, and economic 
multipliers. Rather than forcing developers to rely on enticing large, established companies from other areas, a 
place can grow its own locally embedded enterprises. The spillover effect of physical proximity between 
innovative companies and research institutions is clearly established, particularly in regard to benefits for 
smaller, start-up firms at the city level of spatial interaction (Audretsch, 1998). However, an outstanding 
university with a biological specialty is not sufficient in itself to create a cluster. Feldman‘s (1994) study 
illustrates how Johns Hopkins University failed, despite its deliberate attempts and numerous grants from the 
close-by Washington, D.C.–based National Institutes of Health, to parlay its well-known medical research 
facility into a dynamic cluster for Baltimore. If the city is not attractive to prospective inhabitants and fails to 
build a critical mass of interacting companies along established networks, sustainable clusters will not develop. 
 
Advocacy organizations receive high marks for cluster creation, according to interview respondents. Investment 
in constructing local advice and social networks can be understood as a risk-minimizing behavior in the face of 
steep odds (Gordon & McCann, 2000). The ability of individuals to transform their regional political economy 
through social networks has been illustrated through case studies of medical clusters in other cities outside 
California (Llobrera, Meyer, & Nammacher, 1999). Technology transfer from a dynamic research university, or 
regional concentration of institutions of higher education with a similar specialty, is a sine qua non for 
development of an innovative industry cluster (Audretsch, 1998; Rosenberg, 1982). Stanford University 
successfully applied the Massachusetts Institute of Technology‘s model of technology transfer, based on 
frequent communication between participants (Saxenian, 1994), to create Silicon Valley. This in turn inspired 
Richard Atkinson, chancellor of the University of California, to follow the success of Stanford‘s Frederick 
Terman by building a biotech base through university technology transfers in San Diego in the 1980s (Markoff, 
1997). After selling his high-tech business because he was diagnosed with cancer, retired entrepreneur Bill 
Otterson acquired an interest in health issues along with a new lease on life. UCSD hired him to head 
CONNECT, the first major network organization linking San Diego‘s life science industry companies, chief 
executive officers (CEOs), and products to each other and the larger community. Assisted by San Diego‘s 
Regional Economic Development Council (SDREDC, BIOCOM & PriceWaterhouse,1998), CONNECT was 
founded by UCSD in 1985 as an ―incubator without walls‖ for nurturing high technology companies. Otterson 
became a ―hands-on, in-your-face bulldog for the technology industry‖ (CONNECT board member, personal 
communication, March 18,1998), introducing entrepreneurs to financiers, and politicians to technology issues. 
Local political bodies recognized the general benefit to their constituents in assisting the economically 
important industry with votes favoring specific programs benefiting bioscience concerns. 
 
The urge to organize San Diego‘s life science companies came from one local scientist-entrepreneur who 
attended a meeting in San Francisco about facilitating biotechs and came back greatly impressed with the 
attempt to project industry concerns across a wide range of issues (Parks, personal communication, April 
22,1998). The Biomedical Industry Council (BIC) primarily represented industry CEOs. Founded in 1991, the 
San Diego Biocommerce Association (BIOCOM) widened the industry‘s impact by including representatives of 
other groups affected by biotech‘s success, from law and accounting firms to hospitality and real estate 
representatives. Both BIOCOM and CONNECT actively lobby government bodies at every level on issues of 
concern to the industry. BIOCOM/san diego grew out of BIC and BIOCOM. The systemic integration of these 
organizations with SANDAG and San Diego‘s EDC enhanced the impact of key corporate investors and 
innovators. 
 
Individuals who work in the same industry, serve on joint advocacy and study committees, and meet together 
frequently forge powerful organization networks to raise bioscience‘s profile in both the community and state. 
Several examples illustrate this point. Efforts to recruit highly competitive research and managerial talent 
include showcasing cliffs cascading with colorful poppies and lunch breaks taken up with windsurfing. More 
challenging are substandard schools, traffic gridlock, and immigration problems. The campaign to neutralize 
negatives is in high gear, from industry‘s advocating K-12 public school board candidates to stiffening high 
school requirements to end ―social promotions.‖ Individuals involved in this industry employ both human and 
institutional networks to build a better social base for their economic endeavors. As in other states nurturing a 
bioscience cluster, integration of university, industry, and social networks constitutes a key feature (Haug, 1995; 
Walcott, 1999). 
 
 
BIOSCIENCE LOCATIONS WITHIN METROPOLITAN SAN DIEGO 
The roles of risk financing and real estate location, the financial and physical capital, constitute the fourth and 
fifth proposed factors in cluster creation. San Diego‘s size and the concentration of most of its bioscience 
components on the north side helped forge a cohesive cluster. SANDAG divides the region into major statistical 
areas (MSA) for data purposes. The North City MSA, which includes part of the city of San Diego as well as 
Del Mar, Poway, and unincorporated La Jolla, is home to UCSD and most of the biotech companies. It also 
features the San Diego region‘s highest amount of retail shopping space, the largest population and number of 
housing units of all the regional MSAs (one quarter of the total in both categories), the fastest growth, and the 
highest median household income (SANDAG, 1998). 
 
The centrality of the university-scientist connection to bioscience businesses (Audretsch & Stephan, 2000; 
Zucker et al., 1998) accentuates the competitive edge for real estate in close geographic proximity to the 
innovation source. A study of biotechnology IPOs showed that San Diego companies listed the highest 
percentage of scientists from local research institutions on the science advisory boards of new biotechs 
(Stephan, Hawkins, & Audretsch, 2000). A map of life science companies in San Diego relative to the campus 
of UCSD illustrates this geographic attraction for business clusters (see Figure 4). 
 
Locating close to the university serves several purposes. Given the expense of biotech research and 
development facilities, the ability to use university infrastructure represents a considerable cost savings. 
Because a tenured faculty scientist-inventor often supervises the innovative development, company 
management feels a strong need for frequent access to the laboratory benefiting from corporate grants. Venture 
capitalists prefer visiting their portfolio investments in the minimum number of stops. Clustering clearly works 
to the advantage of the financier with a portfolio of local firms (personal communications). The opportunity to 
lunch, linger, and listen with other capitalist entrepreneurs in nearby restaurants is another cluster plus often 
cited. One interviewee stated that San Diego now has more technology than it can manage and plenty of venture 
capitalists who understand how to form successful clusters and commercialize inventions to successful products 
(personal communication). Geographic proximity demonstrably promotes knowledge spillovers from a flow of 
ideas that fuel economic growth (Audretsch,1998; Glaeser et al., 1992). Along with proximity to major research 
centers, a colocation strategy is based primarily on real estate considerations, given the shortage of affordable 
and suitably modifiable spaces in primary locations. Several interviewees indicated reasons for the demise of 
the ―virtual company‖ include the ―high tech–high touch‖ desire to see the product, the grant-funded laboratory, 
and the scientist. Venture capitalists invest in building relational networks, requiring proximity in this contact 
sport (Fried & Hisrich, 1995). 
 
The centralizing factor for each cluster, aside from UCSD, is real estate development marketed for either 
prestige or affordability, depending on the company‘s life cycle stage. An apparent location contradiction in this 
high-cost-high-risk industry is the concentration of facilities on extremely expensive land despite the fact that 
most executives in a recent poll indicated that their primary site consideration was affordability 
(SANDAG,1998). For the loan-providing institution, however, the primary consideration is its lease turnover 
time. The weak financing outlook of prospective tenants hampers provision of biotech facilities. The facility 
must be re-let quickly to other tenants without loss to the owner and must not be rapidly rendered 
technologically obsolete. Ideally, the facility is built as a generic lab cell with the ability to expand easily. The 
facility must be market-specific for present and future users. 
 
An address-matched map of bioscience firms, along with their local cluster affiliation, is provided in Figure 4. 
Predominant facility type indicates the stage of the firm in the development cycle. Funding dominates the life 
cycle of bioscience firms. The generative idea often comes from the laboratory discovery of a key scientist. The 
second stage requires seed capital from personal funds or venture capital for incubator exploration of product 
potential. The third ―early‖ stage often involves national programs such as Small Business Innovation 
Research–type funding through the FDA testing period. Traditional venture capital usually assists at the later 
stages of precommercialization. Sustained FDA approval procedures can require ―mezzanine‖ capital.
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Following FDA approval, the IPO can provide funds to manufacture a key product. The final stage results in a 
self-sustaining income flow and independent quarters (Arthur Anderson, 2000). At any stage, the incipient 
biotech company can merge with or be acquired by another firm, often a large pharmaceutical company with a 
compatible product line, deep funding, and experience in the manufacture and distribution process. San Diego‘s 
shortage of water looms as a potential deterrent to mature-stage development of manufacturing facilities. The 
shortage of affordable land for manufacturing also conspires to keep companies quiet concerning their 
combination of production with R&D facilities. 
 
The most intense concentration of firms is clearly around UCSD, along adjacent Torrey Pines Road and 
surrounding mesas. Medical laboratories indicate the presence of several hospitals along the ring road around 
the university and its medical school. The next university-hugging cluster is the University Town Center, 
located on flatter land at the base of the university rise and adjacent to an upscale mall of the same name, 
reflecting the comfortable incomes of those who live and work nearby. Rents in this modern glass tower office 
complex are high. Bioscience businesses not able to afford the area closest to the university seek industrial or 
science park spots along major transportation arteries, where they can reach universities and research centers in 
less than 30 minutes (personal communications, April 22-24, 1998; October 30, 1998). 
 
The Sorrento Valley structure to the northeast of UCSD illustrates two very common and important real estate 
strategies. Several bioscience companies occupy customized renovated warehouse space within a tech-park 
cluster, in buildings linked by a parking lot and subleased from one dominant tenant. These start-ups need 
affordable, limited space characterized by several industry architects as one small reception area in front, a 
conference room, space for doctorate-level research, technicians, and a laboratory in the back. Much warehouse 
space is built on speculation and quickly reconfigured by adding plumbing, ductwork, filters, and refrigeration. 
 
Bioscience businesses cluster in local office and industrial parks along a major road connecting busy highway 
routes 5 and 15. Strip malls and apartments line the direct road frontage, with industrial parks stretching less 
obtrusively behind, as predicted in a study of metropolitan land-use restructuring (U.S. Congress Office of 
Technology Assessment, 1995). The Miramar cluster directly to the north of Miramar Naval Air Station 
occupies affordable land in an industrial park. The Clairemont Mesa cluster to the south of the air station lies on 
another highway connecting road. Zoning requirements limit the height of buildings close to the Pacific Ocean 
to three stories in Torrey Pines and La Jolla. The firm photographed (Sibia) occupies the original site of the 
Scripps Institute of Oceanography. 
 
A general typology of bioscience firm life cycle location can be constructed based on interview evidence and 
direct observation of every life science cluster in metropolitan San Diego. Location of facilities proceeds from a 
university research laboratory to a low-cost site in a subdivided warehouse near other biomedical firms, then to 
a larger area in a more prestigious place closer (and pricier) to the university of its birth. Employees of growing 
high-tech firms, for example, reported that their time of joining a company was measured by its square footage 
at that stage. The final step is product manufacturing, which takes place in a separate facility at a greater 
distance from the city. Owners seeking to start a business in the more affordable eastern county area are 
precluded from doing so unless it involves manufacturing. This situation often results in splitting a firm into 
headquarters in the UCSD vicinity and a production facility to the south or east of the administrative office 
(personal communications, 1998). 
 
CONCLUSION: GROWING BIOSCIENCE IN A NURTURING CULTURE 
Sustaining a thriving base of bioscience companies in a particular place requires certain features that are more 
specialized than general innovative milieu needs. This case study discussed five specific categories. Presence of 
an outstanding research university in a specialized field constitutes the first critical component of an innovative 
milieu. Bioscience companies, more than computer or other technology-related businesses, need to remain in 
close physical contact with university labs. San Diego is well supplied with bioscience research institutions, 
from UCSD to the Scripps and Salk institutes. 
 
A regional culture that supports failure, as long as lessons are learned and applied in the next attempt, 
constitutes the second factor assisting growth of an innovative milieu. Biotechnology represents a particularly 
high-risk-high-reward innovative sector. The disjunction between a scientific innovation and a commercial 
success in medicine further complicates the chances for a firm‘s longevity. This makes it even more desirable 
for a region to contain a number of such companies, given the high employee turnover rate. San Diego 
embodies the West Coast culture of open communication. 
 
The next major requirement consists of dynamic individuals, from Terman at Stanford to Otterson and a handful 
of entrepreneurs in San Diego, who exercise leadership by constructing and energizing advocacy organizations, 
such as CONNECT and BIOCOM. They also utilize these organizations to promote information exchange 
networks. Bioscience centers demand a free flow of ideas between laboratory scientists, entrepreneurs, and 
doctors. San Diego‘s leadership sprang from both business and university sectors, creating organizations and 
raising bioscience‘s profile to politicians and others who have benefited throughout the metro area and state. 
The fourth crucial component of innovative milieus is the availability of adequate nontraditional risk financing. 
Due to the high risk and long time needed for testing that involves human subjects, the amount of funding 
needed is particularly large for biotech companies. The interest of deep-pocket large pharmaceutical companies 
in securing new products for development is another factor. Again, San Diego was fortunate to combine a 
supply of venture capitalists in nearby Northern California with Eli Lilly‘s interest in one company‘s product 
application potential. 
 
The last major comparative component lies in the need for a three-tier real estate market, providing space for 
companies from incubation to start-up and through established market-seasoned success. Given the inherent 
messiness of biotech businesses, the need for specially configured laboratories, and the high turnover rate, the 
real estate market must support both subletting and a bedrock of amenities for employees. San Diego has been 
willing to invest in all of these. Demand for clustering drove original sites up the price escalator, with 
occupancy maintained by bank preference for lucrative, easy-to-fill offices. The combination of these factors 
created a physical, fiscal, institutional, and human network supportive of a particular high-technology sector 
with clear needs and rewards for its city and citizens. Success came from indigenous seeds and efforts of indi-
viduals absent in other places, leaving San Diego an innovative biotech beachhead. 
 
NOTE 
1. Capital needed for the prolonged stage of testing the product after it gets off the ―ground floor‖ of discovery 
and initial development. This capital can be harder to raise than that at the venture stage because returns are 
reduced in proportion to risk reduction. 
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